The Director-General remains deeply concerned about the presence of nuclear material at undeclared sites in Iran and that the Agency does not know the current location of such nuclear material. The Director-General is increasingly concerned about security issues, even after about two years. remain unresolved with respect to the four sites in Iran that have not been reported to the Agency. -IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi The IAEA Board of Governors will then meet from 13 to 17 September. Since June 2020, the Council has not adopted a new resolution calling for Iran`s cooperation, which would provide the IAEA with the necessary support to monitor Tehran`s compliance with its legal non-proliferation obligations. The Director-General underlines this, highlighting the Council`s previous support in the report, adding: „More than a year later, Iran has still not provided the necessary explanations for the presence of nuclear particles at any of the three sites (sites 1, 3 and 4) where the Agency has made additional access. Iran also did not respond to the agency`s questions about the other undeclared site (Site 2) or clarify the current location of natural uranium in the form of a metal disk. Director General Grossi also tried to implicate Iran before the release of this safeguard report, but Iran refused his request to travel to Tehran to meet with Iranian officials.2 Iran will continue to implement its comprehensive safeguards agreement, which is mandated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) under the February 21 joint statement. This Agreement grants inspectors access to sites where nuclear material is produced and stored. States that do not comply with the NPT may also sign safeguards agreements with the IAEA, known as article-specific safeguards agreements. India, Pakistan and Israel, for example, have placed civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and India has an additional protocol in force. Overall, Iran has shown a consistent reluctance to meet its security obligations. In addition, evidence of the existence of undeclared materials and equipment has continued to grow, as have the disturbing statements of the IAEA. Instead of showing a willingness to compromise, Iranian government officials have now issued threats to the IAEA and the board if it takes action, measures systematically applied to other member states that violate their protection obligations or refuse to cooperate with the IAEA.
We call on Iran to immediately fulfil its obligations and comply with its security obligations. The United States welcomes the continued professional and impartial efforts of the Director-General and the Secretariat to implement Iran`s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In particular, we note the Director General`s continued efforts to involve Iran in the need to provide the information and access necessary to resolve the Agency`s problems related to four undeclared sites in Iran, including three locations where the Agency has determined the presence of nuclear material. As we have repeatedly emphasized, these issues relate to Iran`s legal obligations under its safeguards agreement under the NPT, not its commitments under the JCPOA. And as noted in the Director-General`s report in GOV/2021/52, these issues remain unresolved even after more than two years. The Governing Council has a responsibility to support the Director-General and the Secretariat in their efforts to maintain the effectiveness of the international safeguards system on which we rely to have confidence that nuclear material will not be diverted for prohibited purposes. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began efforts in 1993 to better limit the ability of NPT member states to illegally search for nuclear weapons after secret nuclear weapons programs in Iraq and North Korea revealed weaknesses in the organization`s existing security measures. On 15 February, Iran notified the IAEA of its intention to suspend accession to an additional protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and other monitoring measures required by the nuclear agreement. This was imposed by a December 2020 law designed to pressure the United States to waive JCPOA-related sanctions more quickly. The IAEA began issuing a „broader conclusion“ for some states where the CFS and AP were in force, as part of ongoing efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards and reduce costs. Each year, the IAEA must recertify a more complete conclusion and verify that a State`s declaration is both correct and complete. In other words, its nuclear materials must be used for peaceful purposes without any evidence of diversion.